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Abstract The ideology, propaganda, and political discourse of the Communist
Party of China (CPC) have continued to function as key elements of the
political system of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the post-Maoist
period since 1978. In the first term of the Xi Jinping leadership (2012–2017),
the CPC, for instance, elaborated on its guiding ideological concepts, devised
inventive ideational framings of phenomena usually perceived as tangible (such
as the BNew Normal^), engaged in complex intellectual debates on crucial
topics (such as Beco-civilization^), intensified and diversified its argumentation
patterns and discursive strategies, and consolidated ideational governance over
some citizens’ individual values, beliefs, and loyalties. Furthermore, it is often
no longer possible to differentiate between the CPC’s internal and external
propaganda, as seemingly exclusively domestic ideational and discursive issues
increasingly correlate with international phenomena. However, the trends in the
Xi era do not present paradigmatic shifts, but rather an overall reassertion-cum-
innovation of previous Maoist and post-Maoist uses of ideology, propaganda,
and political discourse, primarily aiming at strengthening one-party rule.
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Introduction
The idea behind this special issue derives from our intention to fill the void
that exists in understanding the fundamentals of governance in today’s China.
The beginning of the new millennium has witnessed a resurgence of academic
interest in how the Communist Party of China (CPC) has adapted its gover-
nance to new realities within the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and its
involvement in the globalization processes. This wave of studies has effectively
led to a reconsideration of the former paradigm held by those China watchers
who engaged in speculation about the prospect of China’s democratization in
response to the demise of communism in Central and Eastern Europe in the late
1980s. The current scholarly consensus holds that although the CPC has
apparently vacated many policy sectors it previously monopolized, its internal
reforms and ability to adapt to new realities have until now proved to be
sufficient for the party to continue to manage the PRC as a Leninist party-
state (e.g. [4, 11, 19, 20]). It is the CPC’s simultaneous ability to modernize
and adapt, as well as its adherence to Leninist ideological and organizational
principles, which has engendered a neo-socialist system where the combination
of centralization, strengthening, and the adoption of a selective retreat of the
party-state has played a crucial role in guaranteeing both economic growth and
social stability ([15], 5–12). The state-centered paradigm, therefore, seems to
remain the most valid one for the study of Chinese contemporary politics [6].
Since the ascendancy of the fifth generation’s leadership in November 2012, the
CPC, with Xi Jinping at its core as the most powerful leader since Mao
Zedong, has been intent on enhancing the party’s governance over state and
society and pursuing a proactive foreign policy [12].
The authors of the articles included in this special issue believe that official ideology,
propaganda, and political discourse in contemporary China’s political processes and
everyday reality demand more scholarly attention. Before the 19th CPC Congress of
18–24 October 2017 brought increased international attention to the issue of ideology,
few publications had discussed this phenomenon in the Xi era. In general, there has
been a lack of systematic research on China’s contemporary ideology, propaganda, and
political discourse comparable to the seminal volumes dealing with the Maoist and
early post-Maoist eras (e.g. [9, 16–18].
This collection of five articles, therefore, aims to partially fill this knowledge gap by
presenting a multi-faceted investigation of the CPC’s ideology, propaganda, and
political discourse during the first term of Xi Jinping’s leadership (2012–2017). A
preliminary conversation on this topic was initiated at a workshop organized on 15
September 2015 by the Power and Strategies of Social and Political Order research
platform of the Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences (http://power.
orient.cas.cz/), which also sparked a resolve among several of the participating
presenters to continue their research and publish their conclusions in a collaborative
format by the end of Xi Jinping’s first five-year term. We were delighted that our
publication proposal was accepted by the Journal of Chinese Political Science in the fall of
2015.Work-in-progress articles were presented as part of another workshop held in Prague on
15 June 2017, and were finalized and submitted for double-blinded peer review
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throughout the summer and fall of 2017, when an additional workshop was held in Prague on
27 October 2017.1
Ideology, Propaganda, and Political Discourse in Contemporary China
Before we started working on this project in 2015, scholars were in agreement
that, despite the more pragmatic and rationalized policy agenda pursued by the
CPC throughout the reform era in a new governing paradigm, ideology
remained at the core of the PRC’s political system. It serves as a belief
system, which conveys a particular worldview and an outlook on an ideal
society, and as the guide to the CPC’s actions, which enables the party-state to
legitimize and operationalize various practices, institutions, and organizations
[2, 7, 8]. Propaganda is the Blife blood^ of the Chinese party-state as it
remains one of the key means by which it secures popular support, which in
turn is the source of the CPC’s authority to govern in the post-revolutionary
era ([1], 8). By means of propaganda, the party not only controls the dissem-
ination of information and ideas, but also tailors its response to emerging
socio-political challenges associated with modernization and globalization, thus
preventing other actors from undermining the CPC’s legitimacy and challeng-
ing its official narrative ([5], 4, 30). Through meticulously devised and con-
trolled discursive practices, language use, and recourse to key vocabularies, the
party-state aims to manage the complex ongoing transformations in China’s
politics, society, culture, and other realms [3, 13]. It can be argued that
ideology, along with propaganda and political discourse, as well as efficient
party-state organization, continue to hold together the PRC’s Bvast building
made of different kinds of brick and stone^ in much the same way as
examined some fifty years ago by Franz Schurmann in his pioneering work
Ideology and Organization in Communist China ([17], 1).
The following five articles explore some of the most significant developments in the
ways in which official ideology, propaganda, and political discourse feature in con-
temporary China, providing a temporal focus on the first term of the Xi Jinping
leadership (2012–2017). Due to our research and writing schedule, therefore, the
conclusions of the respective articles do not reflect the outcomes of the 19th CPC
Congress, even though they do so tangentially. Nevertheless, we believe that the
Congress and its aftermath confirm our overall assertion of the lasting centrality of
ideology and its operational implications for all actions taken by the CPC and,
therefore, for all processes occurring in the PRC. This fact is more than openly
evidenced by the coining of the expression BXi Jinping Thought on Socialism with
Chinese Characteristics for a New Era^ (Xi Jinping xin shidai Zhongguo tese
1 We are grateful to the reviewers of the articles in this issue for their availability and insightful comments,
which greatly helped to improve the quality of our research. We are also thankful to the journal’s editor-in-
chief Guo Sujian for his personable approach and constructive feedback throughout the entire publication
process. We also acknowledge the support of the Strategy AV21 research program of the Czech Academy of
Sciences (http://www.avcr.cz/en/), which provided funding and a venue for the workshops. We are also
thankful to Heike Holbig and Lutgard Lams who offered comments on the draft of this Introduction.
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shehuizhuyi sixiang)2 and its subsequent inclusion within the party constitution.3 The
new guiding ideology was also enshrined within the PRC’s constitution at the first
session of the 13th National People’s Congress on 5–20 March 2018.4 Looking at these
outcomes, we are inclined to envisage the lasting importance of ideology in the politics
and the political system of the contemporary PRC. But even without falling into the
temptation of making assumptions about the future, we should underline that, in many
ways, our research anticipates some of the crucial questions that we believe will
continue to be highly relevant for China and the world during Xi’s second term as
paramount leader.
Kerry Brown and Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova analyze in great detail
the functioning of ideology as the CPC’s guide to action. They conceptualize
ideology as a body of practices, a system of beliefs, and its associated language,
and they argue that its importance has not disappeared in the post-Mao era. This
body of practices might appear to be more carefully concealed, but it still aims to
achieve sustainable one-party rule, the assertion of discipline, and the control of the
core tactical spaces. They identify a set of twelve keywords as fundamental tenets of
the CPC in the first term of Xi Jinping’s discursive space. These terms aim to
achieve emotional as well as intellectual impact, and to assist in the delivery of the
party’s major goal for the twenty-first century – the creation of China as a great
nation with the CPC at the heart of its governance. As expected, Xi Jinping Thought
was enshrined in the party constitution at the 19th CPC Congress, with the
limitation on the number of terms the State Chairman (guojia zhuxi) and State
Vice-Chairman (guojia fuzhuxi) could serve being removed from the PRC’s consti-
tution by the National People’s Congress in March 2018,5 effectively enabling Xi to
rule for another decade.6 As the article states, Xi Jinping has until now been able to
deliver focused political commitments, setting forward the practical goal of the
BGreat Rejuvenation of the Great Chinese Nation^ and arguing that the party’s rule
is necessary for achieving it. Since the 19th CPC Congress, Xi Jinping’s name has
2 For more on Xi Thought, refer to, for instance, Lam, W.W. 2017. What is Xi Jinping thought? China Brief
17(12): 4–8. Retrieved from https://jamestown.org/program/what-is-xi-jinping-thought/ on 13 January 2018;
and to Son, D. 2017. Xi Jinping thought vs. Deng Xiaoping theory. The Diplomat. 25 October. Retrieved from
https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/xi-jinping-thought-vs-deng-xiaoping-theory/ on 15 February 2018. For more
on ideology in the Xi era, refer, for instance, to [10, 21].
3 Xinhua. 2017. Xi Jinping: Secure a decisive victory in comprehensively building a moderately prosperous
society, strive for the great victory of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era. Work report
delivered to the 19th CPC national congress [Xi Jinping: juesheng quanmian jiancheng xiaokang shehui,
duoqu xinshidai Zhongguo tese shehui zhuyi weida shengli. Zai Zhongguo gongchandang dishijiu quanguo
daibiao dahuishangde baogao]. 27 October. Retrieved from http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/19cpcnc/2017-
10/27/c_1121867529.htm on 13 January 2018.
4 National People’s Congress. 2018. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xianfa xiuzheng’an [Amendments to the
PRC constitution]. March 12. Retrieved from http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2018-03/12
/content_2046540.htm on 2 April 2018.
5 Ibid.
6 Another indication of Xi’s growing power was provided by his elevation to the position of CPC Bleadership
core^ (lingdao hexin) at the CPC Central Committee’s Sixth Plenum on October 24–27, 2016. According to a
People’s Daily editorial, championing Xi Jinping as the Bcore^ is in line with the Bcommon wish of the entire
party, the entire army, and the Chinese people of all ethnic groups^ and is also in Bthe fundamental interest of
the party and the nation^ (People’s Daily. 2018. Unswervingly promote comprehensive strict governance of
the party. 27 October. Retrieved from http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1027/c1003-28814106.html on
25 April 2018).
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become synonymous with the BNew Era^ in China, but his BThought^ is strictly
associated with his signature traits analyzed in the article, such as strengthening the
emotional appeal of the Party’s message and asserting the continuity of China’s rule
by tapping into various, even contradictory, layers of Chinese cultural tradition.
Heike Holbig turns her attention to the crucial issue of economic growth and
examines the legitimizing function of the widely debated concept of BNew
Normal^ in China’s public discourse from late 2013 to late 2016. Elaborating on
existing studies of the economic implications of the phenomenon, she illustrates
how political and intellectual elites have used this notion to frame the regime’s
economic performance in a manner conducive to the maintenance of its legitimacy.
Although evidenced by rising living standards and material wealth, economic
performance is an intangible phenomenon, experienced only through linguistic
constructions and framings of social reality. The CPC’s quest for legitimacy thus
relies on shaping public perceptions and influencing the subjective meanings
against which performance is measured. The article argues in favor of the impor-
tance of ideology in the reproduction of regime legitimacy and highlights the
ideological processes of competition over the control of political language and
the contestation and decontestation of political concepts in public discourse. Spe-
cifically, domestic economic performance, albeit slower than in the years of rapid
growth, has been effectively mediated by perceptions that the Chinese party regime
is outperforming other regimes. The author shows that the legitimizing function of
the New Normal discourse results from targeting both international and domestic
audiences at the same time. While addressing an international audience by focusing
on the interaction between the Chinese and global economies and emphasizing the
recognition China receives from the global community, the state media coverage of
the New Normal examined by the article also targets the domestic audience. The
legitimizing use of the concept as ascertained by Holbig appears again in Xi
Jinping’s Work Report to the 19th CPC Congress, which situates China’s entry
into the New Normal within the context of unprecedented domestic stability,
progress, aspirations, determination, and achievements, all in stark contrast with
the slow recovery of the international economy, multiple local conflicts, and the
exacerbation of global issues.
Maurizio Marinelli critically engages with the debate on the Anthropocene and its
interrelationship with the discourse on Beco-civilization^ in the Xi Jinping era. In
China, the term Beco-civilization^ originally appeared in the academic domain in the
1980s, when the agricultural economist Ye Qianji (1909–2017) emphasized how
humanity might benefit from nature, but also act in the nature’s interests. Later, the
term was appropriated by political discourse. Engaging in an analysis of the work of
older generation intellectuals, Marinelli proves that the concept of eco-civilization, in a
similar way to the Anthropocene, has a significant discursive power, with the potential
to shift from the binary political economy discourses of Bgrowth^ versus
Bdevelopment^, and Bsocialism^ versus Bcapitalism^, to generate eco-socially sustain-
able prosperity. Marinelli argues, however, that the way in which the idea of eco-
civilization construction was enshrined in the CPC’s constitution is a typical example of
the Bfuture perfect tense^: projecting the construction of eco-civilization in a possible
perfectible future. Especially in light of Xi Jinping’s emphasis on Beco-civilization^ in
his opening speech at the 19th CPC Congress, the question today is whether or not Xi’s
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poignant remark BAny harm we inflict on nature will eventually return to haunt us^7
(which would seem to echo Ye Qianji’s 1980s position) stems from a sincere willing-
ness to act, which could encourage the leadership to prioritize the need for harmony
between humans and nature and implement relevant policies in the Bnew era^ of the
present, or whether it may prove to be mere political rhetoric. From the beginning of the
19th CPC Congress, the CPC incorporated BBeautiful China^ into its two-stage
development plan for building a great modern socialist country by the mid-twenty-
first century. Xi Jinping emphasized how China Bmust cherish our environment as we
cherish our own lives^, and then poignantly declared: BTaking a driving seat in
international cooperation to respond to climate change, China has become an important
participant, contributor, and torchbearer in the global endeavor for ecological
civilization.^8 In China, the convergence of the academic discussion on eco-
civilization with the politics-policy nexus could provide an opportunity to question
the unsustainable logic that rapid industrialization, extensive land development, and
full-scale urbanization leads to long-lasting progress.
Lutgard Lams offers another study of China’s political discourse, targeting
both domestic and foreign audiences. She examines the various strategies used
by the Chinese authorities to disseminate the official narrative of China, also
known as the BChina Story ,^ to international publics and as a means of
legitimizing continued CPC rule at home. She argues that this discursive
enterprise exemplifies the ongoing uneasy coexistence of transformative and
conservative dimensions in the Chinese official discourse and communication
climate. In the past two decades, although China’s once monoglossic commu-
nication environment yielded a certain plurality of voices in debating non-
sensitive political, social, and economic issues, the party-state continued to
direct all participating voices and ensured their adherence to the BMain
Melody^ tuned by the CPC. Examining the convergences and divergences of
the strategic narratives of Xi’s era with the political discourse of previous
leaderships, Lams finds that although new slogans, such as Bthe Chinese
Dream^, the BNew Normal^, the BFour Comprehensives^ and the BCommunity
of Common Destiny ,^ appear to be Xi Jinping’s hallmark and cumulatively
contribute to the BXi Jinping Thought^, no paradigmatic change of ideology has
emerged from these narratives. Yet, the Xi era has brought forth a significant
intensification and diversification of the previous argumentation patterns and
discursive strategies, which, in addition to domestic propaganda, have also had
an impact on China’s international communication and public diplomacy as the
country has sought to adopt a more active role and promote its BChina Model^
as a newer and more equitable global order. At the 19th CPC Congress, Xi
Jinping made clear that the party will continue to strengthen its Binitiative in
the ideological sphere^ (yishixingtai lingyu zhudaoquan) and Bdiscursive
power^ (huayuquan), while its Bmajor country diplomacy with Chinese
characteristics^ (Zhongguo tese daguo waijiao) will seek to build a Bnew type




O. Klimeš, M. Marinelli
Finally, Ondřej Klimeš delves into the CPC’s ideational governance in Xinjiang,
where protracted ethno-political tensions have for decades jeopardized China’s domes-
tic security and foreign policy. The study focuses on how the party-state employs
religion, culture, education, the media, and other intangible spheres as ideational
apparatuses to instill desirable political values among Xinjiang’s Uyghur community.
The CPC continues to use ideology as a means of transforming the Uyghurs’ world-
view and political values into action, and regards it as a vital element of politics in
Xinjiang. The study finds that the Xi leadership has adopted a novel security framing of
the Xinjiang problem, brought forth by the region’s pivotal position in China’s foreign
policy. To achieve Bsocial stability and permanent order^ and the Bmodernization of the
Xinjiang governance system and capacity ,^ during Xi Jinping’s first term the national
and provincial authorities advanced a complex Bethnic unity^ and Bde-extremization^
policy. Its result is firstly the continued incorporation of the CPC’s ideational objectives
into new laws and regulations, which started with the latest escalation of violence after
2007. Secondly, its result has been a range of grassroots campaigns against allegedly
Bextremist^ religious and cultural practices, including stepping up controls over the
media, cyberspace, and other aspects of information transfer, political narrative, and
public debate in Xinjiang. In line with practices illustrated by the other articles in this
special issue, as well as existing research, this article concludes that the early Xi
leadership substantially accelerated and expanded the development of mechanisms to
control religion, culture, and other crucial attributes of Uyghur ethnic identity. Klimeš
thus identifies no systemic departure in Xinjiang’s ideational governance under Xi
Jinping when compared with previous administrations, but rather an expansion and
innovation of its techniques. The 19th CPC Congress hinted that, in future, the party
was likely to continue the trends established in the ethnic, religious, and cultural
policies associated with Xi’s first term.
Common Themes and Findings
The aim behind this special issue is to offer a thematization and contextualization of
propaganda, ideology, and political discourse in contemporary China, analyzing both
their context and their internal developments, with a focus on the first term of Xi
Jinping, but also in relation to previous eras by looking into their continuities and
disjunctures. By thematization, we mean the exploration of the crucial thematic
elements of propaganda, ideology, and political discourse in order to concentrate on
key ideas, concepts, and subjects that deserve further reflection and in-depth analysis,
such as one-party rule, the public discourse on Bthe New Normal^, the intellectual and
political discourse on Becological civilization^, the prospective Bcommunity of com-
mon destiny ,^ and Bethnic unity and de-extremization^ in Xinjiang. Our decision to use
thematization as a guideline is not intended to be all-encompassing since while we have
identified these themes as strategically important and recurrent in the political dis-
course, they are by no means the only ones. The selected thematic elements, however,
appear to be among the most relevant, as they relate to a multitude of cultural-political
and socio-economic domains. Therefore, we believe that they allow us to shed light on
the multiple layers of the politics-policy nexus (the connection of political goals with
policy tools). Our study indicates that these thematic elements are often used as
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propagandist rhetorical tropes, and that it is necessary to delve deeply into the origins,
the development, and the context of the relevant political and/or intellectual debates in
order to understand the distinctive value and quality of the selected themes. Therefore,
thematization becomes a method of analysis, a systematic way to conduct a critical
inquiry, which goes beyond the headlines and offers insights into the selected themes of
propaganda, ideology, and political discourse, thus proving their relevance even beyond
the 19th CPC Congress.
Thanks to our thematization approach, we have identified a number of common
themes, which we believe are of key significance for socio-political research in
contemporary Chinese politics. The Xi era has brought forth further elaborations on
guiding ideological concepts (common themes for Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova),
inventive ideational framings by the leadership of phenomena usually perceived as
tangible (Holbig), complex interplays of political discourse and intellectual debates on
crucial topics, such as Beco-civilization^, related to the social and environmental
challenges for China’s present and future development (Marinelli), intensified and
diversified argumentation patterns and discursive strategies (Lams), and, in particular
contexts, consolidated ideational governance over individual values, beliefs, and loy-
alties (Klimeš). The authors find, however, that the general trends of the Xi era do not
present paradigmatic shifts, but rather an overall reassertion-cum-innovation of previ-
ous uses of ideology, propaganda, and political discourse in the Maoist and post-Maoist
eras. This collection of articles thus corroborates the argument that the innovation of
governance terminology under Xi does not necessarily mean a revision of basic patterns
and techniques of governance ([14], 322).
Furthermore, two of our authors (Holbig and Lams) notice an increasingly insepa-
rable conjunction of domestic and international propaganda into a single discursive
process. As a result of global information era trends, it is often no longer possible to
differentiate clearly between the CPC’s internal (duinei) and external propaganda
(duiwai xuanchuan). The other articles (Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova, Marinelli,
and Klimeš) also indicate that under the Xi leadership, even seemingly exclusively
domestic ideational and discursive issues can have international implications and are,
therefore, approached with closer regard to China’s position in global affairs. This is
caused, firstly, by the information globalization of the internet age and, secondly, by the
fact that Xi’s China has developed a more assertive international strategy, manifested
by the aspirations of its Bmajor country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics^
(Zhongguo tese daguo waijiao) to forge Ba new type of international relations^ (xinxing
guoji guanxi),9 or even to be the Bguide^ (yindaozhe) in building a Bnew international
order^ (guoji xinzhixu).10
The authors also note the continuous appearance of the compound word wenming in
political discourse. Here, the authors analyze different, as well as complementary,
angles, such as the attention paid by the leadership to the concept of Bspiritual
civilization^ (Brown and Bērziņa-Čerenkova), the problematic debate on the civiliza-
tional state vis-à-vis the complexity of translating Becological civilization^ – often
9 National People’s Congress 2018.
10 China Cadre Learning Network. 2017. The Btwo guidances^ raised for the first time by Xi Jinping deeply
meaningful [Xi Jinping shouti Bliangge yindao^ you shenyi]. Retrieved from http://www.ccln.gov.
cn/hotnews/230779.shtml on 13 January 2018.
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presented in the official English texts as Bprogress^ (Marinelli), and the state-driven
reshaping of personal religious and cultural values in the name of Bcivility^ in the case
of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang (Klimeš). The relevance of the wenming concepts in the
official political discourse is analogous and closely related to the tighter weaving of
China’s cultural and philosophical traditions into the contemporary ideology and
propaganda of the Chinese party-state. This process is observable both in external
national image and soft power building efforts (Lams) and in domestic ideational
governance (Klimeš).11 Finally, all authors find that official ideology, propaganda,
and political discourse is designed by the CPC to describe in the Bfuture perfect tense^
(Marinelli) the political goals and the image of an ideal, Bpretend world^ of the future
(Klimeš; [13], 346), rather than current reality.
Altogether, these conclusions also open up the space for further research, for
example on the multiplying ways in which the official ideology is transferred by
political discourse and propaganda onto various PRC constituencies; on the interplay
of these transfer processes among the various political actors both within and without
the CPC; on the impact of official ideology on society and individuals; and on the
reactions of target groups to the party-state’s ideational efforts.
This special issue thus illustrates in multiple ways the strong aspiration of the
contemporary Chinese party-state to employ propaganda and political discourse in
order to project ideology when dealing with both domestic society and the international
community. At the pivotal 19th CPC Congress in October 2017, Xi Jinping heralded
the beginning of a Bnew era^. The question remains, however, as to whether under the
CPC’s leadership there is any possibility in contemporary China of achieving a truly
Bnew era^ in the use and function of official ideology, propaganda, and political
discourse, or whether we will witness a continuous reassertion-cum-innovation of this
fundamental triad which, while offering newly coined keywords, will substantially aim
at strengthening one-party rule.
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